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ABSTRACT 
Last year Brazilian people experienced a worrying prospect for capitalism’s ability to 
self-regulate its growth. In the background, an ideal of “development” as “solidarity 
among social classes and ethnic groups” – which started with the democratic transition 
of 1988 and was eventually implemented during the four Workers’ Party executives – 
has unexpectedly disappeared. Beyond the great concern for the future, the Brazilian 
scenario of the last two years offers sound evidence of the need to promote a strong 
legal and institutional framework to manage rapid economic growth. 
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RESUMO 
No ano passado, o povo brasileiro testou uma perspectiva preocupante para a 
capacidade do capitalismo de autorregular seu crescimento. No fundo, um ideal de 
“desenvolvimento” como “solidariedade entre classes sociais e grupos étnicos” – que 
começou com a transição democrática de 1988 e foi implementada durante os quatros 
mandatos executivos do Partido dos Trabalhadores – desapareceu inesperadamente. 
Além da grande preocupação com o futuro, o cenário brasileiro dos últimos dois anos 
oferece evidências sólidas da necessidade de promover um forte quadro jurídico e 
institucional para gerenciar o rápido crescimento econômico. 
 
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Responsabilidade empresarial; Crescimento sustentável; 
Contradições do Crescimento Capitalista; Governança e Governo. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Last year Brazilian people experienced a worrying prospect for capitalism’s 
ability to self-regulate its growth. Few main events may be reminded to sustain this 
statement. The Lava-Jato investigations, as well as other inquiries (i.e. Zelotes), 
revealed a context of steady corruption involving politicians, corporations and their 
controllers; the Rio Doce tragedy reminded us, once again, of the never-ending conflict 
between environment and industrial capitalism; the Panama Papers scandal disclosed 
the shameful search for “tax havens” by businessmen, as well as the adoption of tax-
avoiding arrangements by their corporations. White-collar crimes have recently 
become the focus of court inquiries but most of the trials are still far from an end, 
despite the rise of people’s anger against the political establishment and its financial 
supporters.  
In the background, an ideal of “development” as “solidarity among social 
classes and ethnic groups” – which started with the democratic transition of 1988 and 
was eventually implemented during the four Workers’ Party Governments – has 
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unexpectedly disappeared. Along with it, the cross-consensus obtained both among 
the working class and the élite. Anxieties and new social tensions have never stopped 
growing since the former President, Dilma Rousseff, was impeached. While judges 
have shown an active approach to political matters1, the majority of the congressmen 
reiterate the domestic competence of the Legislative to resolve “ethical affairs”, 
including the recent corruption scandals involving political leaders. 
Starting from a mass media storyline, the word “crisis” has been adopted in 
common and academic language to describe a prolonged interruption of economic 
growth, which has been followed by widespread mistrust of political bodies. Illegal 
funding of political parties emerges as one of the main issues which put the State’s 
financial participation in energy companies at risk and fostering the austerity plans 
supported by the new Executive. A recent constitutional reform has limited public 
spending for the next twenty years; perhaps an excessive measure in a country with 
gross inequalities in wealth distribution. Interestingly, no measure has been adopted 
to increase Executive accountability in light of spreading corporate lobbying. 
Beyond the great concern for the future, the Brazilian scenario of the last two 
years offers sound evidence of the need to promote a strong legal and institutional 
framework to manage rapid economic growth. All over the world people are becoming 
conscious of the multiple flaws of market globalization, especially when it is ruled by 
big corporation standards. However, while postcolonial countries have always suffered 
company abuses, the sovereign debt crisis has spread the fear of losing standard of 
living and democratic institutions among Western citizens. 
By highlighting the common ground of these dynamics, this paper aims to 
show how the present Brazilian deadlock may be ascribed to the main features of 
capitalism, among which some are “foundational” while others have a “changing” 
character. For example, there is a widespread knowledge that global competition 
stresses the lives of working people – since it asks for more flexibility – as well as the 
States’ capability to apply social policies – by demanding lower taxation rates. Thus, 
                                                     
1 For “active approach”, in this perspective, we mean an interpretation of the Federal Constitution by the 
tribunals which aims to allocate decisional powers to the Judiciary both on political matters and on 
whether the members of the Congress under investigation are allowed to maintain their charge: 
http://bit.ly/2hYyKDi 
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the global market is challenging constitutional limits to “endless inequality growth”. 
However, the withdrawal of the State from the economic regulation has been followed 
by a general request for State intervention to rescue companies “too big to fail” – 
shifting onto the taxpayers the costs of self-regulation failures. Finally, the present 
stage of capitalist development has apparently maximized the social costs of financial 
speculation by unleashing the fear of State and banks’ insolvency.  
Even though these contradictions have inspired new developments in the field 
of legal studies, the jurists’ culture is shaken. In the absence of State controls on the 
global market, new commercial law models have been shaped starting from corporate 
uses, through what has been called a «reflexive process». However, the main 
characteristic of these transnational legal schemes is the tendency to absorb under 
their discipline not only the private aspects derived from companies’ activities. As 
shown by some comparative studies, the principle of private autonomy has been 
boosted as a common standard for the global market regulation. There is no field of 
international investments where corporation have not insisted on regulating their 
activities in the host State, as well as any dispute arising from. At the same time, even 
acknowledging this great pressure by the industrial and financial élite, the distinction 
between “economic (self)regulation” and “governance” is still crucial in order to 
implement human rights and sustainable growth in Brazil. 
Within national borders, public powers are struggling to defend the 
effectiveness of fundamental rights, environmental protection and the democratic 
process form privatization. Thus, if the consolidation of a global system of business 
regulation seems unavoidable, there is a little sign of the renewal of constitutionalism 
– even though there are noteworthy efforts in this sense by public law doctrine2. 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
2 Many contributions underline the existence and the need of converge among legal tradition in order to 
shape an effective governance beyond States’ borders. It is worth recalling the recent collective work, 
Introducing global integral constitutionalism. In Global Constitutionalism, Vol 5, March 2016, p.1. 
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2 CORPORATION RULES, PRIVATE PROFITS, PUBLIC RISKS  
 
Those processes have happened especially since some big corporations 
prefer to create their “own standard of law”, instead of enforcing State rules. The “Lex 
Mercatoria”, the arbitration chambers of the different areas of the world and the Unidroit 
principles are some of the best-known examples of what has been called «a 
Transnational concept of Law»3. The 2007-2008 crisis severely questioned the 
sustainability of a self-regulated market but it did not modify the exposed trends. State 
authorities still denounce the lack of means to prevent the main dangerous practices 
– as speculation, fraudulent bankruptcies, tax avoidance schemes – which have 
characterized the development of the “corporate predatory capitalism”. 
The maintenance of this situation, despite the evidences of continuous abuses 
in detriment of the common good, is caused by two main reasons.  
First, as it has been recently reaffirmed, the capitalist system cannot exist 
without some «foundational contradictions», thus, crises are endemic, as they 
represent «moments of transformation in which capital typically reinvents itself and 
morphs into something else» (HARVEY, 2015, p. 4). Some dynamics of capital 
accumulation plainly encourage legal infringements, especially by the Chief Executive 
Officers (CEO), to which the corporation shareholders frequently offer an extra income 
to promote their own interests. The maximization of the main shareholders’ profit, as 
well as corporate limited liability, foster a “factionist economy” within which common 
good and remaining stakeholders’ interest (employees, consumers, small 
shareholders) represents a minor goal. The 2007-2008 crisis revealed (again) how 
conflicts of interests inside corporation governance can undermine company survival 
and market equilibrium while, at the same time, providing huge profits to those 
managers and owners without ethical concerns.  
Second, inequalities are not only the direct consequence of the current capital 
accumulation mechanism, but the reflex of legal arrangements consolidated during 
previous phases of its development. Tax-payers always bore the rebalancing after 
                                                     
3 Among the most recent and complete contributions to this concept (see GLENN, 2005, p. 840).  
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financial losses. What has changed after 2008, however, is the magnitude of the 
system breakdown due to new potential of the finance economy after the end of the 
Golden Exchange Standard. As David Harvey (2015 p.37) noted:  
 
 
When money was constrained by being anchored, however weakly, in the 
material availability and relative scarcity of the physical money commodities, 
then there was a material restraint upon the infinite creation of money. The 
abandonment of the metallic base of the world’s money supply in the early 
1970’s created a whole new world of possible contradictions. Money could be 
printed ad infinitum by whoever is authorised to do so. The money supply lay 
in the hands of fallible human institutions such as the central banks.   
 
 
While the mass media repeat the mantra “Too big to fail” to justify the massive 
hijack of public money from public services to “bank bailout”, the same «false economic 
theory» driving the courts approach to corporate abuses, granting impunity to their 
directors and main shareholders4. 
Privatization and bailout are practices internationally used by corporations to 
shift business risks on public shoulders in times of crises. However, this result can be 
moved up as a result of unfair investment agreements, as it was for Brazil when the 
country was still enjoying a sound economic growth. For example, art. 23 of Act 
n.12.663/2012 (General Act of the FIFA World Cup) introduced the strict liability of the 
Brazilian State for damages caused by «third parties» and for «natural phenomena». 
The obligation to refund economic damages to FIFA was introduced as a result of an 
international negotiation, although the Brazilian Constitution adopted subjective civil 
liability as unique rule. The case was examined by the Supremo Tribunal Federal (ADI 
4976), which stated that the provision respect the Federal Constitution and the national 
public order. The judgment also “approved” the articles of the General Act of the FIFA 
World Cup which grant to the international organization free access to the Judiciary 
and tax exemption. 
                                                     
4 As noted by the CORPORATE REFORM COLLECTIVE, Fighting Corporate Abuse. cit., 49, «The 
argument of maximizing shareholder wealth at the expanse of all other stakeholders therefore lacks 
both legal and theoretical support. However, acting against the interests of the company for the sole 
gain of shareholders has not yet been tested in courts of law as a criminal offence».   
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The next two paragraphs will develop these aspects, in order to understand 
the relations between the legal and non-legal dynamics which govern corporate 
capitalism, as well as their reciprocal nourishing.  
 
 
3 THE (UN) SUSTAINABILITY OF CORPORATE LIMITED LIABILITY  
 
During the 1990’s, the world admired the spectacular achievements of a free-
and-with-no-frontiers market since academic studies were celebrating a renewed 
primacy of human rights legal culture through the growing use of «political 
conditionality» in investment treaties (especially towards developing countries)5. In 
2016, in the wake of the European integration crisis and the end of US unilateralism in 
the Middle East, this scenario seems no longer reliable.  
An apparently transversal anti-establishment movement attacked the most 
questionable features of corporate capitalism, even those which come from the oldest 
tradition of the legal studies on corporations. So, when the House of Lords of the United 
Kingdom upheld the limited liability for corporations in the landmark case Salomon vs. 
Salomon (1896)6, maybe nobody could imagine the following implications of this 
decision. The legal recognition of corporate personality soon became an essential 
quality in international business, as foreign competitors beyond the English borders 
asked for the same legal protection to their own legislators. Thus, if incorporation has 
reduced the risks for businesspeople personal assets, nonetheless it has been the 
target of strong critics as long as it increases the chances of misconduct and dubious 
company failures7. Furthermore, while a “fictional” or “artificial entity” theory about 
                                                     
5 UVIN, Peter; BIAGIOTTI, Isabelle. “Global governance and the “new” political conditionality”, in Global 
governance, vol.2, no.3, 1996, 377-400. ANUNOBI, Fredoline O. The Implications of Conditionality, 
Lehman: University Press of America, 1991. For a critical approach about institution-building experience 
in developing countries, see MATTEI, Ugo; NADER, Laura. Plunder: when the rule of law is illegal. New 
Jersey: Wiley, 2008. See also, PAFFARINI, Jacopo. Fundamental rights and migration of judicial models 
in the conditionality of investment treaties and transnational public policies. The Cambodian case. 
Revista Brasileira de Direito, Passo Fundo, vol. 10, no.1, 2014, 33-47. 
6 Available, in English, at the following website page: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1896/1.html.  
7 Fists criticism of the «separation of ownership and control» in corporate organization were raised by 
BERLE, Adolf Augustus; MEANS, Gardiner. The Modern Corporation and Private Property. London 
(UK)- New Brunswick (USA): Transaction Publishers, 1932, p. xlvii: «At the same time that economic 
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incorporate organizations (and, thus, liability) «may be appropriate for small owner-
controlled and financed companies in which shareholder and directors are the same 
people», it is more problematic when applied to big corporate enterprises. In the 
aftermath of Wall Street Crash of 1929, Berle and Means (2005) wrote:  
 
 
At the same time that economic power has built up in the hands of corporate 
management, the separation of ownership and control has released 
management from the overriding requirement that it serve stockholders. 
Profits are essential part of the corporate system. But the use of corporate 
power solely to serve stockholder is no longer likely to serve the public 
interest. 
 
 
It has been said that Berle and Mean’s condemnation of director’s broad 
powers aimed to depict corporations not just «as a business entity», but as «social and 
political institution» (CHEFFINS, 2005, p. 487). Turning the approach on corporate 
business matters in such a way has at least two main consequences. 
First, if the company is a socially accountable institution, shareholders’ 
interests cannot benefit a general preference on remaining issues, as some economic 
theories have proposed. It is at the very least dubious to say that «maximizing profits 
for equity investors assists the other “constituencies” automatically», as well as 
upholding the fiction that «the participants in the venture play complementary rather 
than antagonistic roles»(EASTERBROOK; FISCHEL, 1991 p. 38). Conflicts of interest 
are still endemic not just between shareholders, as a whole, and employees, local 
communities and costumers, on the other side. The rapid increase of revenues of 
transnational companies has given much more relevance to the divergences among 
equity owners and between these and the directors’ own interests.  
Second, if corporate limited liability is justified since it encourages investments 
which are deemed necessary for “job creation” and the implementation of products’ 
characteristics, there is nothing which justifies the automatic extension of that 
protection to its managers. Nonetheless, the last one is broadly accepted in the 
                                                     
power has built up in the hands of corporate management, the separation of ownership and control has 
released management from the overriding requirement that it serve stockholders. Profits are essential 
part of the corporate system. But the use of corporate power solely to serve stockholder is no longer 
likely to serve the public interest».  
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business world, although commerce is now completely different from the time when 
there was a general identification between the senior executives and the shareholders 
(CORPORATE REFORM COLLECTIVE, 2005, p. 85). 
Since the agency theory influenced most of the landmark courts’ decisions on 
corporate governance and directors’ accountability, its costs8 – not just for companies’ 
stakeholders, but for the public in general – turned an intolerable burden. In order to 
continue the exposition, it worth distinguishing two main aspects of liability: one related 
to the corporate organization, the other to its officers.  
 
 
4 LEGAL MODELS CHALLENGING THE COMMONWEALTH  
 
Even if most of the corporate decisions – as highlighted by the studies cited 
above – come from the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) rather than the shareholders, 
there is a further consideration to be made. Any kind of market presumes some 
“formally-equal-actors” bargaining according to the forms permitted by State 
regulation. That is what normally happen for common people, but it does not include 
enterprises negotiating across national borders. International investment and finance 
law favoured Western companies, as it allows specific retaliations when the host or 
borrowing country commits treaty violations, regardless of any connection of those with 
the repayment of the loan or the specific performance agreed. Nonetheless, the 
political conditionality of the international treaties has been the “legal arm of Western 
civilization”, since it has legitimized and promoted normative transplants and 
adaptation along the 1990’s and the beginning of the new century. The more foreign 
investors sustained the economy of a developing country the fewer have been the 
                                                     
8 JENSEN, Michel C.; MECKLING, William H. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs 
and Ownership Structure. In Journal of Financial Economics. Vol. 3, no.4, 1976, 305-360. According to 
the Authors: «We define an agency relationship as a contract under which one or more persons (the 
principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves 
delegating some decision-making authority to the agent. If both parties to the relationship are utility 
maximizers, there is good reason to believe that the agent will not always act in the best interests of the 
principal. The principal can limit divergences from his interest by establishing appropriate incentives for 
the agent and by incurring monitoring costs designed to limit the aberrant activities of the agent».  
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objections by the host authority and international observers to the effects of a legal 
transplant9.  
At the same time, however, some researchers highlighted that there are few 
chances of “successful transplant” when it supposed to implement human or workers’ 
rights. The majority of the reports blame the plutocracy and the corruption ruling the 
host countries with the consent of local governments – as in the World Bank Legal Vice 
Presidency “New Directions on Justice Reforms”10. Others have underlined that a 
similar lack of accountability characterizes company activities, as most of them did not 
control nor prevent misconduct and abuses by their subsidiaries. Even more significant 
is the protection granted by Western courts to the holding company, through some kind 
of “post-modern adaptation” of the Salomon vs. Salomon principle of corporate 
personality. Thus, it is quite impossible to establish any form of accountability at the 
“centre” of an enterprise network if the directors are conceived as agents appointed by 
the shareholders to maximize their profits.  
Beyond the explicit legal infringements, it is possible to detect some frequent 
forms of abuse which stand out as demonstration of the anxiety that stands between 
the normative and the socio-political status of a corporation. 
 
 
5 ESCAPING TAXATION  
 
The Panama Papers scandal reminded to public opinion that it is simple (and 
profitable) to avoid taxes through the use of offshore companies and, above all, that it 
is “lawful” in most of the cases. Contradictions in tax law recently gained more 
                                                     
9 (Mc CONNAUGAY, 2001, 595-656). It is interesting to read the Author's word: «This Article 
distinguishes “developed” from “developing” nations in a purely functional way. Developed nations are 
those nations that enjoy fully developed legal infrastructures and the ability to effectively regulate 
commercial activity-principally the major industrialized trading nations of the West, perhaps along with 
the few most advanced industrialized nations of Asia. Developing nations are those nations whose 
judicial and commercial regulatory institutions lack the capacity to perform their prescribed or intended 
functions effectively, whether because the institutions do not exist, because they are under-developed, 
because they are under-funded, or because of some other disabling attribute, such as corruption» 
10 World Bank Legal Vice Presidency, The World Bank: New Direction on Justice Reform. A Companion 
Piece to the Updated Strategy and Implementation Plan to Strengthening Governance, Tackling 
Corruption, May 2012. Available at: http://bit.ly/2ocvOF2  
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consideration in academic studies, as the sovereign debt crisis stresses the paradox 
of this huge amount of multinational revenues which are constantly subtracted from 
the public budget (POGGE; METHA, 2016 p. 173-204). From this perspective, it may 
be said that tax policies have always been subjected to a kind of compliance with 
longstanding economic theories. Classical economic studies usually assume taxes as 
a cost for enterprises that is eventually paid by the consumer, since it is added to 
commodities prices. If this statement may be true in an ideal economy, it has been 
proven hard to uphold with reference to corporations, whose one key investment is 
always in legal advice to get around fiscal regulations. Hence, tax and offshore secrecy 
systems are the main pieces of a complicated tax-avoiding system which, however, 
exploits the gaps left by «outdated principles» of the international tax system. 
According to some of the most advanced studies:  
 
 
This flaw is the failure to treat multinationals according to the economic reality 
that they operate as integrated firms under central direction. Instead, a 
principle has become gradually entrenched that they should be taxed as if 
they were separate enterprises in each country dealing independently with 
each other. This can be referred to as the Separate Enterprise – Arm’s Length 
Principle (SE-ALP). (CORPORATE REFORM COLLECTIVE, 2014., p.14). 
 
 
This approach was already anachronistic before the Panama Papers scandal, 
but there no agreement on the possible solutions yet. It is worth saying that the SE-
ALP is based on the international tax treaties of 1920, when investments “beyond the 
borders” basically consisted of loans. The country where the business was based could 
tax profits, while the state of residence of the investor could tax any form of income 
(interest, royalties, dividends and fees). This basic scheme was adapted to 
multinationals without any appropriate regulation to reconstruct the corporate 
subsidiaries’ control chain. Thus, today it is quite common that multinationals have a 
«Parent company» in the country of origin and a “Base entity” – to hold assets and 
receive incomes – in a tax-haven country. The operating companies of different areas 
of the planet pass fees, royalties and interests – which are not taxed in the host country 
– to the offshore unit through a holding company based in a country with ad hoc tax 
treaties (Uruguay, Singapore, Switzerland, for example), therefore they are subject to 
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no or low withholding taxes. Finally, the profits – which do not result from a sale activity 
or fees for services carried out by the operating company – arrive in classical tax 
heavens through a conduit holding company and they can be reinvested in loans to 
the firm’s affiliates or foster circuits of “shadow banking” with all the potential risks for 
the financial markets which have already been highlighted by some studies11.  
When the Panama Papers were published, at least 57 Brazilian politicians and 
rich citizens were named as shareholders of 107 offshore corporations. The main 
reason why Brazilians set up offshore companies is to protect their money from political 
and economic uncertainty which may occur in their country12. Even though offshore 
companies are not illegal, United Nations experts believe they are one of the biggest 
problems for equitable development and support their abolition in order to protect the 
economies of developing countries13.  
 
 
6 AVOIDING LIABILITY 
 
Another central dilemma of corporate governance is represented by directors’ 
personal interest, which– as highlighted above – is frequently in contradiction with that 
of the other stakeholders. The Enron scandal in 2002 raised a strong reaction by the 
media and promoted a debate with widespread effects, also in Brazil. Beyond the 
transnational effectiveness of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX Act) – which extended its 
operability to US investments in foreign companies – the Brazilian Security Exchange 
Commission (Comisão de Valores Mobiliários, CVM) has regulated some concepts 
which were part of internationally accepted standards of corporate governance. As a 
consequence of the introduction of generic legislation requirements innovative Best-
Practices Codes have been drafted, especially under the direction of Brazilian Institute 
for Corporate Governance (IBGC) and the CVM. Although voluntary norms have 
                                                     
11 Among the recent contributions, see RIXEN, 2013, p. 435-459. 
12 That is what Marcelo Hallake, a Sao Paulo based lawyer who advise companies for the law firm Jones 
Day, has said to Forbes about his country: http://bit.ly/2j0G962  
13 See, the press conference of the Independent Expert on the promotion of a democratic and equitable 
international order, Alfred De Zayas: http://bit.ly/2kp4Ghy 
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proven inadequate against CEO misconduct. If they may produce positive effects when 
applied to small and medium businesses, non-legislative standards for Corporate 
Social Responsibility lack effectiveness on multinationals enterprises. The huge 
number of subsidiaries, manufacturing sites or extractive locations, indeed, make it 
hard to carry out an effective control by the parent and the holding companies. For 
example, distances and extremely isolated places may be the causes of a superficial 
monitoring and a failure to prevent environmental accidents, as happened in 2010 
when the British Petroleum oil spilled in the Mexican Gulf. Those difficulties should be 
added to managerial self-interest, which, in this case, probably played an important 
role in covering up warnings on engineering problems in extractive activities and 
downplaying potential risks14.  
If it is always difficult to prove the responsibility of holding companies for 
abuses committed by a subsidiary in a developing country, this is because Western 
jurisprudence on this issue is nothing but an expedient to uphold the fictional 
separation between “nodes of the same business net”. The leading case on this field 
has been the pronouncement of the US Court of Appeal (Second Circuit) which 
rejected a claim filed against Union Carbide for the environmental disaster in the Indian 
region of Bhopal. The decision was adopted on the grounds that Union Carbide India 
Ltd (UCIL) – the operative company in the location where the accident occurred – «is 
a separate entity, owned, managed and operated exclusively by Indian citizens in 
India»15.  
Thirty years later, the “separate entity approach” is still a serious obstacle to 
the recognition of joint-responsibility in lawsuits involving multinationals16. The Rio 
Doce tragedy reminded to Brazilians the human and environmental costs of extractive 
                                                     
14 Recently, an internal report leaked to Greenpeace and published by the Financial Times inform about 
a regular underestimation of incidents and stakeholders’ warnings by the British Petroleum managers 
in extractive sites in USA and Mexico. The news about the leak caused strong reactions by several US 
Congressmen: http://bit.ly/2nOVJ2l 
15 The decision is available in this webpage: http://bit.ly/2peErwT 
16 As a result of this restrictive judicial approach, activists’ campaigns usually bring a straight focus on 
the holding company conducts, in order to obtain the attention of Western public opinion and, especially, 
political institution.    
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economy, especially when controls by the local authority are lacking17. But it also 
reminded that a locally-based enterprise (Samarco Ltd) jointly owned by two giants of 
the mining industry (the half-Australian-half-English BHP Billiton and the Brazilian Vale 
Ldt) cannot be the only responsible because its management is clearly “hired” by the 
two multinationals. Nonetheless, instead of responding to the local judicial authority for 
civil compensations, BHP Billiton and Vale have promoted and upheld a «Framework 
Agreement» for the restoration of the environment and the local communities affected 
by Samarco dam failure18. The Agreement mandates the creation of a further legal 
entity – Renova Fundação – that is an «autonomus Fundation» which should lead the 
compensation of the damages, according to «a transparent and participative 
proceeding»19.  
From a broad-spectrum perspective, the aim of the entire operation is 
questioning both the competence and the impartiality of Brazilian justice institutions in 
dealing with such a huge catastrophe. Vale and BHP have opened a news portal on 
their website in order to provide continuous updates on the steps toward restoration, 
in a way that may be seen as an “alternative storytelling” or a reply to Brazilian mass 
media and NGOs. Finally, there is no consensus on the amount of money necessary 
for restoration – as the Samarco assets are clearly scarce. On the contrary, a huge 
distance exists on what has been offered by BHP and Vale –  as a result of the 
negotiation with the Federal and Minas Gerais governments20 – and what the Public 
Prosecutors have asked21.  
                                                     
17 For some relevant considerations on this aspect of the accident, see the Dom Philips’ article in The 
Guardian, 25 November 2015: https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2015/nov/25/brazils-
mining-tragedy-dam-preventable-disaster-samarco-vale-bhp-billiton 
18 The Framework Agreement between Samarco, Vale, BHP Billiton, the Brazilian and the Minas Gerais 
governments was ratified on 5 may 2016 by the Court of Appeal of Brasilia. However, it was suspended 
by the Suprema Corte de Justiça on the 1 july 2016, due to inadequate previous discussion with the 
Prosecutors and the local community affected. In the aftermath of this decision Vale and BHP declared 
that they will continue to promote the restoration activities as previously dealt: http://glo.bo/2983cTI 
19 That statement can be met among the BHP press releases: http://www.bhpbilliton.com/media-and-
insights/news-releases/2016/10/update-samarco-7 
20 On 28th July 2016, both Samarco and Vale committed themselves to provide 3 billions of Brazilian 
reais as a first payment of the 6 billions fixed in the Framework Agreement of previous May. See, the 
announcement at http://bit.ly/2jDGqb9 
21 On May the 3rd, 2016, the Ministério Pùblico Federal affirmed that the Framework Agreement does 
not consider the real magnitude of the environmental and human calamity. Thus, it asked for 133 billions 
of reais as counter-claim. See http://glo.bo/1rkBOdr 
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7 SELLING OFF INDUSTRIAL INFRASTRUCTURES AND JOBS 
 
The 2008 financial crisis revealed some hidden and contradictory aspects of 
the global banking system which should not be downplayed in order to advance a real 
reform proposal, as it is seems to be a priority for most Western governments’.  
First, we should start from a “founding contradiction” in financial economy: the 
fractional reserve banking. It is worth remembering that lending up to the 90% of the 
money collected is an internationally accepted practice and neither senior managers 
nor the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has ever acted in order to reduce 
this percentage. This is a money creation process in which States have no or very 
reduced control, as it is totally based on “input” (credit requests and borrower 
guarantees) processed by commercial banks. Recently, the access to short-term credit 
has been intentionally made much cheaper, officially, to increase the volume of 
commercial affairs. Financial groups jumped into the industrial market attracted by 
simple and fast earnings. However, their first (and sometimes only) concern was not 
implementing or restoring the productive capability of a corporation, but paying back 
credit interests and share the profits. Thus, a significant amount of money came into 
existence (and so added to the international financial circuit) just because the 
commercial banks loan it to speculators. Frequently, they were simple speculations, 
like, for example, derivative market exchanges or company take-overs directed to sale 
and lease-back their supplies and properties (CORPORATE REFORM COLLECTIVE, 
2014 p.34). Those activities represent a danger, not only for financial market 
equilibrium (i.e. credit insolvency), but in terms of employment and national 
manufacturing capability. During the last twenty years, indeed, insolvent companies 
were bought, their properties sold by the directors in order to share the proceeds 
among shareholders, then leased-back to resume industrial activities for a sort period 
without a clear strategy. That is what happened to many Western enterprises which 
have fallen into crisis and immediately separated from the “healthy part” of an industrial 
group, as the UK’s MG Rover in 2004 and East Coast Railways in 2007. Their 
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production was never restored, nevertheless huge profits – in the second case, backed 
by public money – were earned by some finance groups, which never had a plan to 
run the corporation, but just to “extract value” by selling its assets. The recent 
presidential elections in USA, as well as the raise of anti-EU movement, have finally 
disclose an hidden but widespread anger against the extreme freedom enjoyed by the 
banking system, which is recognized as the main responsible for the “desertification” 
of industrial districts and deterioration of employment conditions. 
Second, this huge amount of money injected in the “real economy” (i.e. 
industrial business) has manipulated the traditional aims of investment activities. Until 
the 1990’s financial activity regulation was settled by national legislators, but, as soon 
as the Anglo-Americans won the “Cold War”, mandatory rules were perceived as out-
dated and more likely to improve political corruption. The Western blame of socialist 
governments of Eastern Europe fostered a sort of undisputable faith in the benefits of 
a less State-driven market, as well as a general confidence that events like the 1929 
crisis were highly improbable in the XXI century. As noted by Brian R. Cheffins (2005 
p. 494):  
 
 
Coincident with the growing disenchantment with government regulation, 
during the 1980 and the 1990s market-oriented conservativisms increasingly 
characterized theoretical analysis of private law issues in United States. 
Contractarian corporate law scholarship fell directly into the line with such 
trends since academic embraces this approach tend to share an overriding 
trust in contracts and marketplace. More concretely, they are content to 
presume that business participants are better positioned to structure 
arrangements affecting companies than lawmakers and professors. 
 
 
Nonetheless, corporate governance scandals – like in the Enron case in 2004 
– have «cast some doubt on the desirability of imitating the American model» 
CHEFFINS, 2005 p. 494) and raising the key issue of directors’ liability. As the most 
accepted theories see incorporation as a way to maximize shareholders’ profits, 
managers are intentionally overpaid to realize this purpose. This approach has heavily 
conditioned –as we have seen – the burden of proof in civil and criminal trials. It is not 
simple to prove misjudgement in commercial affairs, it becomes more difficult when 
the shareholder interest should prevail, even against the interest of remaining 
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stakeholders. For example, the current international banking system, grounded on the 
“fractional reserve”, looks unsustainable in the light of the endemic conflict of interests 
between those who deposit their money in the bank and those who hold the bank 
equities.   
 
 
Banks themselves wanted to put less into reserves because these funds 
earned very little return, and from a shareholder value point of view were not 
being used effectively. Leverage ratio crept upwards […] To encourage these 
ways of maximizing shareholder value, senior managers in banks offered their 
managers, traders, dealers and advisers bonuses that reward high returns, 
without implementing an adequate risk measurement system (CORPORATE 
REFORM COLLECTIVE, 2014 p. 63-4). 
 
 
Beyond directors’ abuses, there is another set of problems that comes from 
the money creation process lead by commercial banks. The global race for GDP 
growth is shaping a twisted competition between governments policies, which 
downplays human and environmental costs of capitalism endless accumulation. In 
recent times, international experts have finally recommended an effective financial 
regulation as a key point to oppose systematic abuses committed by unscrupulous 
directors. It should be highlighted that those practices have found legitimacy since the 
GDP has been used as a measure of nations well-being, not just of business 
performances. So, preserving human rights and sustainable growth starts from 
rescuing economists and governments policies from the misleading parameters which 
cultivated the “GDP fetishism”. That means to build a control mechanism on the 
“money-creation process” in order to prevent any further discretionary access to credit 
not in line with some globally shared political (and not just economic) goals. 
The last international summits (especially the 2017 World Economic Forum in 
Davos) considered the rebirth of political populism as an urgent issue and finally 
backed an open dialogue towards acknowledging a shortage of effective results in 
fighting wealth inequalities22. The other major concern was climate change, because 
the answer should not be limited to the “logistics” of industrial production – such as 
                                                     
22 According to the World Economic Forum Global Risks Report 2017, the raising inequality perceived 
«points to the need for reviving economic growth, but the growing mood of anti-establishment populism 
suggests we may have passed the stage where this alone would remedy fractures in society: reforming 
market capitalism must also be added to the agenda». 
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“bio-technologies” or “green energies”. The reason is that the rapid earnings from the 
injection of short-term credits prevent industrial planning and inhibit research 
innovation for sustainable commodity production23. Hence, it has been observed that 
much more could be done in reducing CO2 emissions if «the responsibility for money 
creation would be placed with an independent agency that – unlike our banks – would 
be democratic, accountable, and transparent, so money would become a truly public 
good. (HICKEL, 2016). 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
According to David Harvey (2015, p.14):  
 
 
If crises are transitional and disruptive phases in which capital is reconstituted 
in a new form, then they are also phases in which deep questions can be 
posed and acted upon by those social movements seeking to remake the 
world in a different imagem. 
 
 
Thus, in the current international context it may be profitable to push for 
fundamental reform and abandon “unstainable development” where corporate abuses 
are frequent. However, understanding the underlying contradiction is a prerequisite to 
advance any reform, therefore, strengthening academic dialogue and cooperation on 
these issues should be a priority for Brazil. Beyond the country’s distinctive 
characteristic, indeed, the features highlighted above can be found wherever 
multinationals invest their money. An endless accumulation of wealth is only possible 
by means of a continuous advance of the geographic borders of corporate business, 
and thus a common answer is the only way to resolve the human and environmental 
crises that they caused. 
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